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Pager attacks
Exploding Hezbollah pagers and handheld radios · 2024

On 17 September 2024, thousands of pagers of the Lebanese terrorist organisation Hezbollah ex­plo­ded more or less simultaneously. Around 5000 pagers had been obtained by Hezbollah shortly before the incident, 4000 of which exploded that day, after receiving a specially crafted mes­sa­ge. In the incident, at least 12 people were killed and around 2750 were injured. A day later, more than 400 handheld radios (walkie-talkies) used by Hezbollah also exploded. Although there was no direct proof, it was widely speculated that Israeli services were behind the attack.

The AR-924 pager from the Taiwanese manu­fac­tu­rer Gold Apollo is intended for use on local infra­structure in the 450-470 MHz UHF radio band, and does not depend on PSTN. Hezbollah used these pagers for security reasons, as they were afraid that their communications via public networks could be intercepted or cut-off.

It seemed that the pagers had been ma­nipulated somewhere in the supply chain be­tween Taiwan and Lebanon, or that a special (fake) company had been setup by an intelligence service to supply manipulated devices to Hezbollah [1].
  

Experts think that Israeli intelli­gence services managed to manipulate the firm­ware and added a small (plastic) explosive device. The Taiwanese manufacturer – Gold Apollo – denied that the de­vices were supplied by them, and suggested that they might have been supplied by Hungarian company BAC Consulting Kft. BAC had purchased the production rights and the use of the brand name for certain regions, and later produced their own pagers under the Apollo brand [2].

A specially crafted message was sent to the newly purchased devices, which triggered a small plastic explosive device that was hidden inside its enclosure. According to the German newspaper Welt, the explosive RDX [4] had been integrated into the batteries. In addition, the markers that are normally present in plastic explosives to reveal them in an x-ray scan, were said to have been omitted. Other sources report that the explosive pentaerythritol tetranitrate, also known as PETN, pentyl or penthrite, was used [9]. RDX and PETN are the main ingredients of Semtex [10].

 More about the AR-924 pager


Improvised explosive device   IED
An improvised explosive device (IED) attack is the use of a homemade bomb and/or destructive device to destroy, incapacitate, harass or distract. They are generally used by criminals, vandals, terrorists, suicide bombers and insurgents [27]. In this case, it appears to have been used by an intelligence service. An IED, such as the subject of this page, consists of these five elements:

  1. Switch ✔
  2. Power source ✔
  3. Initiator
  4. Explosive charge
  5. Container ✔
By using a pager, such as the AR-924, three of the key components are already present: the container (the device's enclosure), the power source (the rechargeable battery) and the switch. The latter can be an electric pulse generated by the existing hardware (i.e. the microcontroller), under control of the internal software (firmware), that activates or triggers the explosive device.

Block diagram of the rigged AR-924 pager

All that is needed to convert it into an IED, is the addition of an explosive device, such as Semtex, and an initiator or detonator. It also requires the devices firmware to be rigged, but as the device was already advertised as having an improved user interface, that should be relatively simple.

Educated guess of the construction of the AR-924 (Copyright Crypto Museum 2024)

The diagram above shows an educated guess of the internal construction of the AR-924 pager. Note that the battery takes about half the volume of the case. It was developed especially for this application and carries the model number LI-BT783. It has four contact terminals: two for (+) and (-) power and two for the internal protection circuit. The latter were used to trigger the explosion.

 More about the AR-924 pager


Israel
Although there is no direct evidence, it is widely assumed by international experts, that the whole operation was planned and executed by the Israeli intelligence services Mossad and/or Shin Bet, in cooperation with the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF). To hide the fact that the pagers were actu­ally manufactured by or on behalf if the Israelis, a complex web of intermediate shell companies was created. Although much is still unclear, this is how we think the companies were related:


The original manufacturer and owner of the Apollo brand name, is the Taiwanese company Gold Apollo. This small electronics company, founded and owned by Hsu Ching-kuang, manu­factures and sells pagers worldwide. He claims that his company did not manufacture the explo­ded AR-924 pagers, but that instead they were made by BAC Consulting in Hungary to whom they had licensed the design and the use of the Gold Apollo brand name, for US$15 per sold unit [28].

This makes BAC Consulting the first company to be exposed after it became apparent that the original manufacturer Gold Apollo in Taiwan had not made the devices. According to inves­tigating journalists of the Hungarian news outlet Telex, it is most likely that BAC was just an empty body created especially for this purpose, with a probably unwitting CEO at its helm [24]. BAC had obtained the reproduction rights to the pager, but had no production facilities of its own.

BAC Consulting also seems to be company behind a newly founded Taiwanese company by the name of Apollo System Ltd. This company was not related to Gold Apollo, although it was headed by Theresa Wu, a former Gold Apollo employee who left the company around the time the deal with BAC was finalised. Apparently, Apollo Systems Ltd. handled the sales and marketing of the AR-924, as it was featured on its (now defunct) website Apollo Systems HK [25]. 1 However, the actual manufacturing was done elsewhere, probably in Hong Kong.

Another company involved in the web of shell companies seems to be the Bulgarian company Norta Global, founded in Sofia by a Norwegian national around the same time as BAC Consulting. Although the Bulgarian security service DANS confirmed that the pagers had never physically been in Bulgaria, the Hungarian news outlet Telex revealed that there had been a flow of money from Norta Global to BAC Consulting, confirming a link between the two companies [26].

  1. Confusingly, Apollo Systems HK, advertised the product as Gold Apollo Rugged Pager AR-924, suggesting that it was a product made by Gold Apollo in Taiwan [25]. In reality though, it was manufactured by them — probably in Hong Kong — under licence from Gold Apollo, for which they payed USD 15 per sold unit.

BAC Consulting KFT   Hungary
According to the Taiwanese manufacturer of the pagers, their Hungarian license holder BAC Con­sulting Kft. could be involved in the rigging of the devices. The company was founded on 5 May 2022 and reported an annual turnover of just EUR 549,420 in 2023 [6]. It is like that it was a shell company, created especially for the pupose of selling rigged equipment to certain parties.

A day after the incident, a representative of the Hungarian president Viktor Orbán, told the press that the pagers had never actually been in Hun­gary, and that BAC merely acted as an inter­me­diary [8]. When reporters visited the company at its registered address [6], no BAC representative was available for comment. At the address – a modest office building in the outskirts of Buda­pest – several other (unrelated) companies were housed, and no one had seen the BAC director since the pager attacks of 17 September [14]. She had reportedly been placed under the pro­tection of the Hungarian security services [15].   

The person registered at the Hungarian Chamber of Commerce as the CEO is Christina Bársony-Arcidacono, a 49 year old Hungarian-Italian multi-lingual physics PhD and businesswoman, who apparently just lend her name to the company, without actually being involved in its business. The CEO has meanwhile been questioned by Hungarian authorities, and has turned over paper­work, such as contracts, invoices and receipts that might be related to the pager business [26].


Norta Global Ltd.   Bulgaria
Two days after the attacks, on 19 September 2024, Bulgarian authorities also started an inves­ti­gation into a company that they thought might have facilitated the sale of pagers to Hezbollah. Although the name of that company wasn't disclosed, Bulgarian media discovered it was Norta Global Ltd. in Sofia (Bulgaria) [12].

This company, owned by Indian-Norwegian Rinson Jose (also: Hose Rinsan), was founded on 14 April 2022, just weeks before BAC Consulting was founded in Hungary. Like BAC, Norta has its headquarters in a local office building along with 196 other (unrelated) companies. In a prelimi­nary statement, the Bulgarian state security service DANS said that it had not detected any ship­ments of the pagers on Bulgarian territory [19]. They later stated that they had found no evidence of the involvement of the company in the attacks against Hezbollah [22]. The paperwork handed over by Christina Bársony-Arcidacono in Hungary however, reveals a connection between Norta and BAC [26]. Over the course of several months, a total of more than one million Euros was transferred from Norta to BAC in several installments. Part of this was payed to Gold Apollo – probably the licensing fee – whilst another sum was transferred to Apollo Systems in Taiwan [26].


ICOM IC-V82 handheld radios
A day after the incident with the Apollo pagers, on 18 September, a similar thing happened to the two-way handheld radios that were also used by Hezbollah [5]. In this case it involved the IC-V82 handheld radio, a 20 year old model from the Japanese manufacturer ICOM. The IC-V82 works in the VHF amateur radio band, which ranges from 144 to 146 MHz (optionally 136-174 MHz).

The ICOM IC-V82 is a straight­forward two-way radio of the kind that are also used by Amateur Radio Operators (HAMs). It was discontinued around 2014, and should no longer be available on the market. ICOM stressed that the devices had not been supplied by them [7]. It is known however, that counterfeit IC-V82 radios (i.e. not manufactured by ICOM) are widely available.

Counterfeit radios are commonly produced in China and are difficult to distinguise from real ones [11]. They are available from electronics stores in Asia and come in 'original' packaging.

The image on the right shows a counterfeit IC-V82 radio that exploded on 18 September 2024. It was taken from a video clip, distri­bu­ted on X by Nikhil Choudhary [18]. It is clear that in this case it is not the battery that exploded, but the front top. Aparently an ex­plo­sive device had been placed in­side the radio, close to the microphone/speaker, which is the part that is closest to the face when the radio is operated. This suggest that it was the intention to cause maximum – potentially fatal – harm to the user.
  

In Bulgaria, an investigation has been launched into a company in Sofia, that might have been involved in the supply of counterfeit IC-V82 radios from Asia to Hezbollah. This is the same company – Norta Global Ltd. – that might have been involved in suppying the AR-924 pagers.

The number of radios (~450) is smaller than the number of exploded pagers (~4000), but since they are larger, they carried more explosives and were therefore more damaging. It is cur­rent­ly unclear how and when the handheld radios were manipulated and how they were triggered remotely, but we can make a few educated guesses. The radio features CTCSS and DTCS — two techniques to selectively open the radio's noice can­celling system (squelsh) with analogue or digital tones. It is also possible to fit an optional DTMF coder/decoder. The latter can be used to activate the pager function of the device, by sending it a 3-digit DTMF user ID. It is likely that a unique combination of the above techniques was used to avoid premature detonation.


Video
Isreal actually made these pagers
This YouTube video explains how Israel managed to not only rig the Hezbollah pagers, but actually manufacture them under the cover of a shell company.

Source
CNN-News18

Date
19 September 2024
  

Figures
Documentation
  1. Gold Appolo Rugged Pager AR924 (archived)
    Product page on Apollo Systems Hong Kong website (meanwhile taken down).
    Apollo Systems HK, 17 September 2024 (via WayBack Machine).

  2. AL-924 Specifications
    Apollo. Undated.

  3. AL-914e User Manual
    Apollo. Undated.

  4. Apollo Pagers Programming Instructions
    Apollo. Undated.

  5. ICOM IC-V82 Instruction Manual
    Visited 21 September 2024.
References
  1. So könnten die Hisbollah-Pager manipuliert worden sein
    This is how Hezbollah pagers could have been manipulated (German).
    N-tv, 17 September 2024.

  2. Gold Apollo says Budapest-based BAC produces model of pagers used in Lebanon blast
    Reuters, Ben Blanchard. 18 September 2024.

  3. Alfred Hockensberger, Es befand sich Plastiksprengstoff RDX in de Batterien
    Welt, 18 September 2024.

  4. Wikipedia, RDX
    Visited 18 September 2024.

  5. Weitere Hisbollah-Geräte explodieren im Libanon - 100 Verletzte
    More Hezbollah devices explode in Lebanon - 100 injured (German).
    N-tv, 18 September 2024.

  6. Chamber of Commerce, company information
    Visited 18 September 2024.

  7. Japan Firm Says Devices Reportedly In Hezbollah Blasts 'Discontinued About 10 Years Ago'
    Barrons, AFP, 18 September 2024.

  8. Orbán rep says Hezbollah exploding pagers were 'never' in Hungary
    Politico, 19 September 2024.

  9. Wikipedia, Pentaerythritol tetranitrate
    Visited 19 September 2024.

  10. Wikipedia, Semtex
    Visited 19 September 2024.

  11. ICOM UK, Warning about counterfeit ICOM equipment
    ICOM Inc., 2018.

  12. Bulgarije onderzoekt nu bedrijf gelinkt aan exploderende biepers
    Bulgaria investigating company linked to exploding pagers (Dutch).
    HLN, 19 September 2024.

  13. Wikipedia, 2024 Lebanon pager explosions
    Visited 21 September 2024.

  14. The mystery woman whose company BAC Consulting is linked to exploding pagers
    CNA, 21 September 2024.

  15. CEO of company linked to Hezbollah pagers being guarded by Hungarian secret services
    Justin Spike, Paolo Santalucia and Sarah el Deeb,
    The Times of Israel/AP. 20 September 2024.

  16. Bulgaria to probe local firm's links to Lebanon pagers
    Baha Breaking News, Christian Baha/RR. 19 September 2024.

  17. Handheld Radios Used In Explosions Against Hezbollah
    YouTube, Ham Radio Crash Course. 19 September 2024.

  18. Videos showing exploded handheld 'IC-V82' radio
    X, Nikhil Choudhary, 18 September 2024.

  19. Bulgaria opens probe into local company linked to Israeli-tampered pagers
    The Cradle, News Desk. 19 September 2024.

  20. Lebanon terror attacks 'long in the making' Israeli op: Report
    The Cradle, News Desk. 19 September 2024.

  21. How Israel Built a Modern-Day Trojan Horse: Exploding Pagers
    The New York Times, 18 September 2024.

  22. Bulgaria denies Sofia-based firm had any link to pager attacks in Lebanon
    AA, Ahmet Gençtürk. 19 September 2024.

  23. Israel concealed explosive devices inside batteries of pager sold to Hezbollah, Lebanese officials say
    CNN, Tamara Qiblawi et al. 27 September 2024.

  24. Pager blasts: 'Mossad companies' in Budapest and Sofia appear to be shell companies, not front firms
    Telex. Dezsö András & Andrea Horváth Kávai. 22 September 2024.

  25. Gold Apollo Rugged Pager AR924 (archived)
    Product page on Apollo Systems Hong Kong website (meanwhile taken down).
    Apollo Systems HK, 17 September 2024 (via WayBack Machine).

  26. Hungarian-Italian woman implicated in pager blasts turned contracts and invoices over to authorities
    Telex. Dezsö András & Andrea Horváth Kávai. 26 September 2024.

  27. IED Attack - Improvised Explosive Devices - fact sheet
    Department of Homeland Security (USA).

  28. The prosecutor continues to track down the pager explosing case...
    ET Today, 23 September 2024 (translated).

  29. Raphael Wimmer, A small #OSINT thread about the AR-924 pager...
    X (Twitter), 26 September 2024.
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© Crypto Museum. Created: Wednesday 18 September 2024. Last changed: Thursday, 03 October 2024 - 21:43 CET.
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