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To: Permanent Representatives: Belgium
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Netherlands
Norway
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From: Secretary General

SELECTION OF TROL CRYPTOGRAPHIC EQUIPMENT (POINT-TO-POINT)

On the 10th July I circulated PO/67/475 explaining the progress made in preparing for the selection of TROL Cryptographic Equipment (Point-to-Point) as between three competing national equipments. At the same time I drew attention to the objection raised by Germany to the use of the United Kingdom equipment Alvis without Vendor in the simplex mode.

2. In that PO I pointed out the difficulty of setting aside or altering the findings of the Evaluation Group of the Military Committee and of the High Level Working Group appointed to select one type of equipment on grounds of cost efficiency. But I made it clear that a final judgement must be suspended until we saw the German paper itself and the further comments on it which had been promised by SHAPE.

3. We now have both these documents before us, the German paper having been circulated under cover of a letter by the German Ambassador dated 14th July and the SHAPE comments being contained in a signal from SACEUR dated 24th July. In that signal SHAPE recommend that an unbiased investigation of the alleged deficiencies of Alvis be carried out by "qualified experts as may be found in an appropriate security agency, such as SECAN". They add that SHAPE would be prepared to participate in such an investigation.

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4. Since these two communications were received I have had the advantage of consulting Heads of Delegations most closely concerned in order to prepare for the meeting of the Defence Planning Committee on 27th July.. No delegation was able to declare a final position on the proposal for tests without consulting their government but there was a tendency to accept that, in the light of the second message from SHAPE, further testing of Alvis without Vendor was the only way to secure progress. I should add that the United Kingdom Delegation while not rejecting offhand a further investigation expressed their strong feeling that further tests were not necessary, Alvis without Vendor having already in their view been evaluated and found acceptable and testimonies to its good performance having been issued in the past by SHAPE.

5. There is, I think, a general feeling that the Defence Planning Committee should be urged to decide to carry out a final selection immediately, in the event of the United Kingdom equipment being cleared by the tests. However, should the Defence Planning Committee approve a proposal for tests, these would take at least two months. It has been suggested that a time limit for reporting by SHAPE and SECAN should be set and I recommend that this should be not later than the end of October.

6. I attach a copy of a suggested procedure for verification, accompanied by an assurance regarding the selection process, which the Committee may wish to consider adopting.

(Signed) Manlio BROSIO

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PROCEDURE FOR VERIFICATION OF THE ACCEPTABILITY OF
THE UNITED KINGDOM ALVIS EQUIPMENT WITHOUT
VENDOR OPERATING IN THE SIMPLEX MODE

1. SHAPE, with the technical assistance of SECAN, will carry out the necessary tests.
2. These tests will be based on a programme prepared by SHAPE in consultation with SACLANT and SECAN and established in conformity with the Commands' requirements (as stated in SGM-280-63).
3. The NATO International Staff will be represented at the tests as observers.
4. SHAPE, advised by SECAN, will report urgently to the Defence Planning Committee on the following question: is Alvis without Vendor acceptable for simplex use by NATO, having regard to the requirements stated in SGM-280-63.

ASSURANCE

In adopting the above-mentioned procedure the Defence Planning Committee have decided that, subject to the Alvis equipment being cleared by the test to be held, selection of TROL Point-to-Point Cryptographic Equipment will be carried out immediately, on the lines indicated in paragraph 5 of PO/67/475 of 10th July, as between the competing equipments offered by member countries and using the ratings already agreed at the Defence Planning Committee. No further tests of competing equipment will be required or considered.