

CONSEIL DE L'ATLANTIQUE NORD
NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL

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SUMMARY RECORD
AC/4-R/516

INFRASTRUCTURE COMMITTEE

Summary record of a meeting held at the Permanent
Headquarters, Paris, XVIe., on 9th November, 1965

PRESENT

Chairman: Mr. M. Chase (Controller for Infrastructure)

BELGIUM

Lt.Col. M. Hanquet

CANADA

Mr. D.M. Watters
Mr. H.G. Long

DENMARK

Lt.Col. K. Thomsen

FRANCE

Mr. M. Dugas

GERMANY

Mr. H. Osterheld

GREECE

Mr. A. Afendulis

ITALY

Col. G. Ragusi

NETHERLANDS

Mr. W.M.J.A. Russel

NORWAY

Mr. A. Bergesen

TURKEY

Mr. E. Sanalan

UNITED KINGDOM

Mr. J.Y. Dickinson

UNITED STATES

Mr. J. Loveland

INTERNATIONAL STAFF

Head of Signals Section :
Adviser for Infrastructure Programmes :
Secretary :

Mr. J. Danton
Mr. A. Counasse
Mr. J.D. Peek

ALSO PRESENT

Standing Group Representative :
SHAPE :

SACLANTREPEUR :

Gp.Capt. H.R. Edge
Col. J.B. Newman
Lt.Col. W. Wolf
Col. B.C. Bovey
Capt. G.F. Hardwick
Wing.Cdr. J.H. Jenkins
Cdr. H.L. Clark

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~~NATO SECRET~~I. CONTINUING NEED FOR INFRASTRUCTURE: CONFIRMATIONS OUTSTANDING ON REPORT TO COUNCIL

Document: Addendum to AC/4-R/513, Annex B

References: AC/4-R/515, Item VIII (2)
AC/4-R/513, confirmations (i)
AC/4-R/512, confirmations (iii)
AC/4-R/511, Item I (1)
C-M(65)83

1. The CANADIAN REPRESENTATIVE recalled that in AC/4-R/514, Item IV, decision (4), the Committee had noted that its report on the continuing need for Infrastructure (C-M(65)83) would not be placed before the Council pending consideration of a Canadian memorandum setting out further proposals. He hoped that this memorandum would be ready for distribution to the Committee in the near future and that the matters raised therein would be discussed at some future date; in the meantime, he could confirm agreement to C-M(65)83 and agree that the report be put before the Council.

2. The TURKISH REPRESENTATIVE said that he was awaiting final instructions from his Authorities. It would help them to reach a decision if they could know whether paragraph 9(a) of C-M(65)83 would be interpreted to mean that the funds allocated to a project programmed, for example, in Slice XVII and which was later deleted from that programme, would be available for use in a subsequent Slice of the Group.

3. The BELGIAN REPRESENTATIVE thought that paragraph 9(a) of C-M(65)83 should be interpreted to mean that when two or more Slices of the Group had been approved there would be flexibility of funds between the approved Slices and not that the separate ceilings for each Slice could under no circumstances be exceeded.

4. The FRENCH REPRESENTATIVE pointed out that the present wording of paragraph 9(a) of C-M(65)83 represented a preliminary statement of the intention. The precise language of this rule would need to be agreed in due time so that it might be included in the Council's cost-sharing agreement. His understanding of the rule was that the funds released by deletion of projects in Slices XVII to XIX would enable the estimated cost of Slice XX to be that much greater provided the deletions had been made before Slice XX had been approved. After Slice XX had been approved, funds released by deletion of projects from the Slices of the Group would not be available for the programming of additional projects in these Slices.

5. The BELGIAN REPRESENTATIVE added, however, that funds so released might be used to cover cost overruns on projects in all four Slices. The same reasoning obviously applied to savings arising where the actual cost of projects proved to be lower than the programmed amounts.

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6. The NETHERLANDS REPRESENTATIVE had the same understanding as the French Representative and he favoured the Belgian Representative's elaboration in that it would reduce reluctance to agree to the deletion of projects which had lost their military importance, and provide the means of meeting cost overruns which were likely to occur on projects in Slices XVII to XX in view of the fact that agreed standards for many of these projects did not yet exist. He went on to suggest that the concern of delegations with regard to the meaning of paragraph 9(a) might be met if the report were amended to invite the Council to note rather than to approve the proposal therein. The proposal could then be further examined by the Committee, in the light of the cost-sharing negotiations, and another report on it submitted. This change would involve deletion of the phrase "the first of which it now submits for Council approval" in paragraph 9 immediately preceding sub-paragraph (a), deletion of "the Committee proposes" at the beginning of sub-paragraph (a) and deletion of the first recommendation in paragraph 10.

7. The COMMITTEE:

- (1) noted that Canada confirmed agreement to the Committee's report to the Council (C-M(65)83) and that Germany had already notified its confirmation prior to the meeting;
- (2) noted the statement by Canada and that the Canadian proposals with regard to eligibility of Infrastructure projects would be distributed to the Committee for discussion at a later meeting;
- (3) in the light of the discussion, agreed not to seek Council approval at this stage for the proposal mentioned in paragraph 9(a) of C-M(65)83; and agreed to amend the report accordingly;
- (4) noted that Turkey hoped to be able to take position on the report within a week;
- (5) invited the Chairman to advise the Secretary General that C-M(65)83, as amended, could conveniently be submitted to the Council on or after 17th November, 1965.

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II. REPLACEMENT OF THE AECENT MILITARY RADIO-RELAY SYSTEM: SHAPE SLICE XVI PROJECT 254H: RESERVATIONS AND CONFIRMATIONS OUTSTANDING ON REPORT TO COUNCIL

Document: Addendum to AO/4-R/513, Annex A

References: AC/4-R/511, confirmations (iv)
 AC/4-R/510, Item IX (5)
 AC/4-R/509, Item III
 C-M(65)78
 SGM-307-65

8. The CHAIRMAN asked whether the position of Greece on Project 254H was still as stated in AC/4-R/513, Item IX, and if so, how was this statement to be interpreted. It would seem that the conditions imposed by the Greek Authorities would have the effect of preventing the implementation of the Project until the programming of Slices XVII to XX had been completed, a delay which would clearly be unacceptable from the military point of view.

9. Group Captain EDGE (SGREP) re-emphasised the military urgency of this Project.

10. In reply to a suggestion by the German Representative that a statement by the NATO Military Authorities explaining the consequences of the conditions which Greece attached to the programming of Project 254H in Slice XVI might lead the Greek Authorities to reconsider their position, Colonel WOLF (SHAPE) said that he had just returned from Greece where he had repeated to the Greek Military Authorities the statements he had already made to the Infrastructure Committee, the Standing Group and the Military Committee stressing the urgency of the requirement for a replacement of the present AFOENT radio-relay system and the consequences of delaying the implementation of Project 254H.

11. The GREEK REPRESENTATIVE said that his Authorities were examining the question in the light of the statements made by Colonel Wolf during his visit and he was hoping for further instructions. Meanwhile, in answer to questions he said that the "corresponding projects" mentioned in his statement in AC/4-R/513, Item IX could not be identified until the plans for the whole ACE area grid system were available.

12. The FRENCH REPRESENTATIVE thought that since the effect of the conditions imposed by the Greek Authorities would be to prevent the programming of Project 254H in Slice XVI, document C-M(65)78, together with an explanation of the Greek position, should be put before the Council so that the latter could decide on the appropriate action to be taken.

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13. The GREEK REPRESENTATIVE requested that submission of the report to the Council be deferred for one more week to allow time for further instructions to be received from his Authorities in the light of their discussions with Colonel Wolf.

14. The NETHERLANDS REPRESENTATIVE asked when the construction phase of Project 254H would begin, assuming that the programming of the Project in Slice XVI was agreed in the very near future.

15. Colonel WOLF said that the Military Authorities were ready to submit a request for funds (approximately £500,000) for a systems engineering study. Twelve months thereafter, a type 'B' estimate for systems engineering would be established which would in turn permit equipment requirements to be determined. A type 'B' estimate for equipment requirements would then be submitted and construction works could begin.

16. The NETHERLANDS REPRESENTATIVE said that if neither equipment procurement nor construction work on the Project 254H could begin until twelve months after the authorisation of funds for a systems engineering study, the plans for the ACE area grid system might be sufficiently advanced in twelve months' time for the Greek Authorities to have the information they required on what was planned in the southern region. In view of this possibility, which also meant that time was available to solve the difficulties raised by other delegations before the project went beyond the stage of the systems engineering study, he proposed that the full amount of the cost estimate of £6,900,000 for Project 254H should be included in Slice XVI, on the condition that only funds for that part of the Project relating to the systems engineering study could be released, subject to the usual budgetary control by the Payments and Progress Committee, and that implementation of the rest of the Project be blocked until a further decision on the matter had been taken by the Infrastructure Committee.

17. The UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE said that his statement in AC/4-R/513, Item IX, setting forth the conditions attached by the United States to the programming of Project 254H should be regarded as superseded by the terms of a letter dated the 4th November, 1965 addressed by the United States Ambassador to the Secretary General. The Netherlands proposal was consistent, in his view, with the terms of that letter.

18. The FRENCH REPRESENTATIVE could not accept the Netherlands Representative's proposal, firstly because the normal Infrastructure practice was to programme a project in its entirety, and secondly because funds authorised for and expended on a systems engineering study would be wasted if Project 254H had later to be abandoned for lack of agreement.

19. The GERMAN REPRESENTATIVE pointed out that a cost-sharing solution for Slice XVI had not yet been agreed. If a request for funds for the systems engineering study was put before the Payments and Progress Committee, it could be covered by the 2% planning funds available under the arrangements for the provisional financing of Slice XVI (C-M(65)82), provided 2% of the part of the Project programmed in Slice XVI was sufficient to cover the request.

20. The CHAIRMAN said that the total of approximately £500,000 required for the systems engineering study might not be called forward at one time and therefore the 2% of the £6,900,000 proposed for programming in Slice XVI might be sufficient to permit the Military Authorities to begin systems planning, pending the conclusion of a cost-sharing agreement covering Slice XVI.

21. The FRENCH REPRESENTATIVE stressed that planning studies in respect of Project 254H had already been carried out; he would regard a detailed systems engineering study as the first step in the actual implementation of the Project, and therefore as not being covered by the agreement on the provisional financing of Slice XVI.

22. The ITALIAN REPRESENTATIVE said that the Netherlands Representative's proposal would meet one of the conditions stipulated by his Authorities in SGM-307-65, Enclosure 2 - i.e. that the realisation of Project 254H be held in abeyance until 30th June, 1967; if the assurance requested regarding projects in the southern region were given by the Military Authorities, he was confident his Authorities would agree to the inclusion of Project 254H in Slice XVI.

23. The NORWEGIAN REPRESENTATIVE made the following statement:

"If the Council would wish at the present time to make a decision on the document C-M(65)78, Norway will be prepared to accept the programming of Project 254H under the 16th Slice of the Infrastructure Programme. The programming will be accepted on the condition that, prior to authorisation of funds and implementation of the project, its technical, operational, economical and procedural aspects be examined by the Infrastructure Committees and the High Level Working Group to review Military Communications Requirements."

24. The FRENCH REPRESENTATIVE expressed the view that, at the earliest opportunity, document C-M(65)78 should be put before the Council together with two Annexes, the first containing a statement by the Military Authorities on the urgency of the requirement for Project 254H and their assurance that it was required irrespective of whether or not the proposed ACE area grid system were implemented, and the second containing the conditions attached by various delegations to the inclusion of the Project in Slice XVI.

25. The CHAIRMAN thought that before such action was taken, delegations should have the opportunity to consider the Netherlands Representative's proposal since it might meet the concern of the Greek, Italian, Norwegian and United States Authorities.

26. The COMMITTEE:

- (1) noted that the United States statement reproduced at Annex A to the Addendum to AC/4-R/513 should be regarded as superseded by the terms of a letter dated 4th November, 1965 addressed by the United States Ambassador to the Secretary General;
- (2) noted the statements made in discussion, and agreed to consider further at its next meeting the Netherlands proposal that the full amount of the cost estimate of £6,900,000 for Project 254H should be included in Slice XVI on the condition that only part of the Project relating to the systems engineering study (estimated cost £500,000) could be implemented, subject to the usual budgetary control by the Payments and Progress Committee, and that implementation of the rest of the Project was blocked until a further decision on the matter had been taken by the Infrastructure Committee.

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III. THE TROL CRYPTOGRAPHIC PROCUREMENT PROGRAMME

Documents: SHAPE 6550.2/23-37 of 4th November, 1965
(INFRASEC/65/229)
AC/4-D/1795
AC/4-D/1764

References: AC/4-R/514, Item I
AC/4-R/513, Item II
AC/4-R/502, Item III
AC/4-R/499, Item I
AC/4-WP/332
INFRASEC/65/92
AC/4-R/497, Item II (7)
AC/4-R/493, Item VII
AC/4-WP/329

27. The FRENCH REPRESENTATIVE referred to the Committee's request to the Military Authorities for a definition in writing of tactical equipment and an explanation of which such equipment SHAPE would regard as eligible for common financing (AC/4-R/514, Item I, decision (2)), and said that it was not

clear from INFRASEC/65/229 that the technical differences between point-to-point and tactical TROL equipment were such that the less expensive equipment could not be used in both rôles. He also pointed out that INFRASEC/65/229 did not appear to have taken account of the criteria for eligibility for the common funding of TROL equipment agreed by the Committee in AC/4-R/514, Item I, decision (1).

28. Colonel BOVEY (SHAPE) stated that when the TROL Requirements Group had been set up, the Major NATO Commanders had wished, from the logistics, maintenance and training points of view, to meet all requirements for TROL equipment with one equipment. As explained in SGM-280-63 the Requirements Group had recognised that no single equipment offered was capable of meeting all requirements for both point-to-point and tactical operation. Two different equipments were therefore required. Appendix C to SGM-280-63 described the military operational characteristics of point-to-point equipment and Appendix D those of tactical equipment. He summarised the differences between the two equipments as follows:- point-to-point equipment was the more complex, and being intended for installation in a fixed location the requirement for ease of maintenance was less stringent than for tactical equipment. Tactical equipment, which was intended for use in an operational environment (e.g. mounted in aircraft, vehicles and ships) had to be capable of operating on a variable power supply and had to be dust-proof and damp-proof.

29. The FRENCH REPRESENTATIVE pointed out the differences mentioned above between the two equipments seemed to be mainly external. If this were so, it should be possible to devise two different models but both incorporating the same cryptographic system, one for point-to-point, the other for tactical use. This solution avoided the difficulty with intercommunication, which resulted from having two equipments employing different cryptographic systems.

30. Colonel BOVEY replied that while the differences between point-to-point and tactical equipment were basically external, the external differences had repercussions of a technical nature on the cryptographic system itself.

31. Group Captain EDGE (SGREP) recalled that it had only been with reluctance that the Requirements Group had concluded that no single equipment then known met all requirements. All nations offering equipment had been represented on the Group.

32. The FRENCH REPRESENTATIVE asked how many tactical equipments the NATO Military Authorities estimated would be eligible for common funding using the criteria in INFRASEC/65/229.

33. Colonel BOVEY said that the estimated requirement for tactical equipment (812 tactical equipments, including requirements for SACLANT and CINCHAN) were being reviewed by the Working Group of National Communications Experts in the light of the screening of the requirement for point-to-point equipment and of the criteria for eligibility for common funding agreed by the Committee in AC/4-R/514, Item I, decision (1) and the definite figure should be available by 30th January, 1966.

34. The CHAIRMAN urged that SHAPE endeavour to advance this date, so that screening by the Working Group of National Communications Experts and the Infrastructure Committee should not be held up.

35. Colonel BOVEY (SHAPE) said that he would try to do so.

36. The UNITED KINGDOM REPRESENTATIVE said that he had now been instructed that a recognised NATO Headquarters could be defined as one which was internationally financed out of a military budget. He could therefore confirm agreement to AC/4-R/514, Item I, decision (1) because this definition would also cover Headquarters which would be given international status in time of war.

37. The GREEK REPRESENTATIVE asked that the position of his Authorities be recorded in the following terms:

"Between two points one circuit should be provided with TROL. The edition of the Standing Group 'NATO Military Command and Organization charts' dated 22nd April, 1965 should be applied to determine 'recognised NATO Headquarters'. The proposition made by the experts that Leros, Salamis and Souda harbours be provided with TROL, should be adopted. This should also apply to the other harbours and Naval administrations included in the proposal made by the above SHAPE document, as these will be commonly used by several nations. National relay stations which would be used for transmitting NATO messages to SAS depots, should be provided with commonly funded TROL installations."

38. The NORWEGIAN REPRESENTATIVE asked for a list of the Headquarters for which the point-to-point and tactical equipments would be commonly funded.

39. The SHAPE REPRESENTATIVE undertook to communicate to the Norwegian Representative the list of AFNORTH Headquarters in this category.

40. The NORWEGIAN REPRESENTATIVE stated that until his Authorities had had an opportunity to study this list, his agreement to AC/4-R/514, Item I, decision (1) would be subject to confirmation.

41. Group Captain EDGE (SGREP) recalled that it had been decided that unless all the problems raised in connection with Project 254L were resolved by the end of 1965, the Project would be deleted from the Slice XVI programme.

42. The CHAIRMAN replied that the question of extending this time limit would need to be discussed by the Committee in December.

43. In reply to a point raised by the Norwegian Representative on the interpretation to be given to AC/4-R/514, Item I, decision (1)(a) with respect to existing facilities, the NETHERLANDS REPRESENTATIVE said that where a facility had been taken over by NATO as an existing facility, TROL equipment to be installed at that facility would be commonly funded because the facility was then regarded as a NATO installation. This interpretation was shared by the rest of the Committee.

44. The COMMITTEE:

- (1) noted that the decision recorded in AC/4-DS/514, Item I (1) was subject to confirmation also by Norway pending receipt of instructions;
- (2) noted the points made in discussion and agreed to pursue the study of the questions raised in AC/4-D/1764 and AC/4-D/1795 at a later meeting.

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IV. TRANSPORTABLE TACAN BEACONS

Documents: INFRASEC/65/227
SHAPE 6580.01.22/23-40/65 of 8th October, 1965
(INFRASEC/65/207)

References: AC/4-R/514, Item II
AC/4(PP)R/594
AC/4(PP)R/513
AC/4-R/418, Item IV
AC/4-D/1647
AC/4-R/395, Item V
INFRASEC/61/136
AC/4-R/383, Item V
AC/4-D/1568
AC/4-R/365, Item II
AC/4-D/1435
AC/4-R/328, Item IV
AC/4-D/1240

45. The CHAIRMAN referred to AC/4-R/514, Item II, decision (1) and asked whether the Danish, Norwegian and Turkish Representatives were now in a position to inform the Committee what stage had been reached in the procurement of transportable TACAN beacons for which they were host country.

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46. The DANISH REPRESENTATIVE said that the stage of procurement reached was still being investigated by his Authorities.

47. The NORWEGIAN REPRESENTATIVE stated that the contract signed by Norway for the procurement of one beacon could be cancelled without financial consequences.

48. The TURKISH REPRESENTATIVE said that since a contract for the procurement of two transportable TACAN beacons had been signed on the 5th March, 1965, and a deposit of 15% of the procurement price had already been paid to the manufacturer, Turkey could not withdraw from the contract without loss. He did not think that the Turkish Authorities could use these beacons for national purposes in the event that the NATO Military Authorities declared them surplus to requirements.

49. Wing Commander JENKINS (SHAPE) replying to the Danish Representative's question said that the minimum military requirement was now for 8 transportable TACAN beacons - 2 in the northern region, 3 in the centre and 3 in the southern region. However, the NATO Military Authorities were prepared to review this requirement if necessary, in the light of the contractual position of host countries.

50. The NETHERLANDS REPRESENTATIVE recalled that his Authorities had suspended action to place orders for transportable TACAN beacons until the NATO Military Authorities took a decision regarding the military acceptability of the AN/TRN-17 beacon. However, the Netherlands Air Staff still considered that there was a requirement in the Netherlands for such beacons, and he could therefore not agree that the Netherlands should not procure such equipment unless the Committee took a formal decision with regard to the distribution proposed by the NATO Military Authorities, particularly since the responsibility for the use and location of the beacon, which the Military Authorities proposed should be invested in the Major Regional Commanders, would normally be a host nation responsibility.

51. The ITALIAN REPRESENTATIVE said that his Authorities had suspended procurement action on 3 beacons; but they still considered that Italy had a requirement for such equipment.

52. In discussion it was proposed that SHAPE seek agreement on interested Ministries of Defence to their plan for controlling the use and location of the 8 transportable beacons. The Committee would then be able to take a decision on procurement action by host countries.

53. The CHAIRMAN said that in the light of the statements made above it would appear that, provided Denmark could suspend procurement action, the total number of beacons procured would be 8 - i.e. the number required by the NATO Military Authorities as a minimum military requirement. He then referred to INFRASEC/65/227, paragraph 2 and asked when certification of the AN/TRN-17 by the FAA would take place.

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54. Wing Commander JENKINS (SHAPE) said that he had been informed by the United States Authorities that the AN/TRN-17 beacon, equipped with a new antenna developed in the United States, now worked satisfactorily. As soon as the beacon had been formally tested by FAA and certified, SHAPE would inform the Committee.

55. The COMMITTEE.

- (1) noted that Denmark would inform the Committee as soon as possible what stage had been reached in the procurement of the transportable TACAN beacon for which it was host country; noted the statements by Norway and Turkey on their procurement positions;
- (2) noted INFRASEC/65/227 and invited SHAPE to inform the Committee as soon as the AN/TRN-17 beacon had been certified for en route and approach;
- (3) invited SHAPE to inform the Committee how it intended, in the light of its discussions with interested national authorities, to distribute the transportable TACAN beacons representing the NATO minimum military requirement, so that final decisions could be taken by the Committee on procurement action by host countries;
- (4) invited Italy, the Netherlands and Norway in the meantime to suspend or continue to suspend procurement action in respect of the beacons for which they were host country.

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V. PROCEDURES FOR FINANCIAL CONTROL OF NADGE

Documents: AC/4-D/1807
INFRASEC/65/217

References: AC/4-R/515, Item VII
NADGEMO/BC/65/615
AC/4-D/1582 (Revised)
AC/4-D/1513
AC/4-D/690

56. The CHAIRMAN said that the table at Annex to AC/4-D/1807 had been prepared by the International Staff on the basis of tables, provided by NADGEMO, showing how payments were likely to be required in practice for the implementation of the NADGE project. It revealed that there was no need for any nation to fear that it would be called upon to provide its currency in 1966 in excess of its capacity to do so.

57. The UNITED KINGDOM REPRESENTATIVE said that if the award of the contract were delayed until late in 1966 and a major demand for currency (such as was envisaged in paragraph 3 of INFRASEC/65/217) were made in, say, February 1967, after the United Kingdom had paid its normal contribution to NATO Infrastructure, there might be some difficulty for the United Kingdom in meeting the demand, seeing that the financial year was reckoned from April to March. He was awaiting instructions from his Authorities on this question.

58. The DANISH REPRESENTATIVE said that his Authorities shared the concern of the United Kingdom. He asked whether a nation might be called upon to make a progress payment to the contractor in the last quarter of 1966 or the first quarter of 1967.

59. General ACCART (Director, NADGE Management Office) replied that the dates on which national currencies were called forward in 1966 would depend on whether or not the timetable for the implementation of NADGE was adhered to, but, so far, there was no reason to think that any delays would occur. He hoped that no payments would be required during the first months of 1967.

60. In further discussion, Delegations indicated that, while the principle underlying the proposed payments procedure was acceptable to them, they would require to study the document requested by AC/4-DS/515, Item VII (2) and to obtain further instructions before deciding on the precise mechanism of the payments procedure. There was general agreement that there was no need for the working group suggested in INFRASEC/65/217 at this stage.

61. The COMMITTEE:

- (1) took note of AC/4-D/1807;
- (2) agreed that there was no need at present for the working group envisaged by paragraph 8 of INFRASEC/65/217; but that the proposal could be reconsidered later, if the need arose;
- (3) took note of the points raised in the discussion of the payments procedure for the NADGE Project, and agreed to resume discussion when the International Staff document requested by AC/4-DS/515, Item VII (2) had been circulated; and invited the International Staff to include in this document proposals for the correlation of NADGE and normal Infrastructure payments in 1967.

VI. PRELIMINARY PLANNING FUNDS: NON-APPLICATION OF 1% RULE TO SLICE XVII UNTIL FUNDS AVAILABLE

References: C-M(58)116, as amended by C-M(59)71
AC/4-R/470, Item III

62. The CHAIRMAN recalled that the Committee had decided that the preliminary planning rule could not apply to Slice XVI since there was no agreement covering Slice XVI. The Supreme Commanders recommended programmes for Slice XVII had been distributed some weeks ago and it was necessary to decide whether a rule should be suspended for Slice XVII also pending conclusion of a cost-sharing agreement. Alternatively, the Committee might be willing to recommend to the Council that the arrangement made to give financial cover for 2% planning funds for Slice XVI (C-M(65)82) should be extended to the 1% preliminary planning funds Slice XVII.

63. The UNITED KINGDOM REPRESENTATIVE thought that agreement on the final cost-sharing solution for Slice XVII might be reached more rapidly if the Committee avoided interim solutions of the kind mentioned above.

64. The NETHERLANDS REPRESENTATIVE was reluctant to agree that the Committee propose to the Council financial cover for 1% preliminary planning funds for Slice XVII, because the Committee had at present little detailed information on the projects recommended for inclusion in this Slice.

65. The NORWEGIAN REPRESENTATIVE understood the view expressed by the United Kingdom and Netherlands Representatives, but thought that a complete halt in planning should be avoided if possible.

66. The STANDING GROUP REPRESENTATIVE (Group Captain Edge) said that the NATO Military Authorities hoped that a way could be found of allowing planning to proceed.

67. The COMMITTEE;

- (1) agreed that, since no cost-sharing agreement had yet been concluded covering Slice XVII, the rule in C-M(58)116 (as amended by C-M(59)71) with regard to expenditure of 1% for preliminary planning funds could not for the present apply to the Slice XVII programmes proposed by the NATO Military Authorities;
- (2) agreed to study at a later meeting the question of extending to the 1% preliminary planning funds for Slice XVII the arrangements set out in C-M(65)82 in respect of Slice XVI.

VII and VIII (deferred)

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IX. MEETING ARRANGEMENTS

68. The COMMITTEE:

after discussion, agreed not to change the Committee's meeting day from Tuesday to Thursday, but to retain Tuesday as the meeting day.

Next meeting: 16th November, 1965

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Confirmations received:

The Secretary has been informed:

- (i) that Norway confirms agreement to the decision taken on AC/4-D/1799 (time allowed for submitting tenders under international competitive bidding), as recorded in AC/4-R/515, Item II;
- (ii) that Germany confirms agreement to the decision taken on AC/4(PP)D/6041 (expenses incurred in establishing NATO's share of the jointly-funded costs on airfields in France), as recorded in AC/4-R/510, Item VI; this decision is now final.

OTAN/NATO,
Paris, XVIe.