NSA Type 1 cryptographic algorithm
SAVILLE is a cryptographic algorithm,
that is widely used by the US Army and
by NATO in high level
It was developed by the GCHQ
in cooperation with the NSA, probably in the late 1960s,
and is categorized as an NSA Type 1 encryption product.
It's early use in VINSON
equipment during the Vietnam War is probably the
reason why SAVILLE has become virtually synonymous with
It is used in many products, such as the KY-57,
The cryptographic keys for devices using SAVILLE were generally transferred
with a universal key fill device,
such as the KYK-13.
The algorithm itself is secret and is often implemented in NSA-developed
modules such as Crypris, Windster and INDICTOR
Below is a technical description that sheds some light on
SAVILLE without revealing the actual algorithm itself .
SAVILLE-based products on this website
The SAVILLE Cryptographic Algorithm
Contribution by a former cryptographer
The SAVILLE cryptographic algorithm — these were called crypto logics in the
old days — is a stream cipher, widely used in cryptographic equipment
used by NATO
and the administrations of NATO-countries.
SAVILLE is a joint development of the
and GCHQ (UK)
and its origin probably dates back to end of the 1960s,
beginning of the seventies, considering the early implementations in devices
such as the US VINSON (KY-57)
and the UK Lamberton (BID/250).
At the time, two teams were formed to develop a new cryptographic
algorithm: one at the NSA and one at GCHQ. At GCHQ, WWII cryptanalist
Michael Crum 1 was involved in the project. Both teams produced algorithms
which were then rigorously analysed by the other agency. In the end,
the GCHQ algorithm was accepted as the better one and became known
as SAVILLE . In most literature however,
SAVILLE is commonly attributed to the NSA.
This note serves to shed some light on the characteristics of this cipher.
It should be clear however, that no secret information is revealed.
Rather, information was used from old unclassified documents and websites
(many of which are no longer available on the web today).
During WWII, Michael Crum was a cryptanalist at
Bletchley Park (BP).
In 1942 he was the first at BP to break into the German
T-52 Geheimschreiber traffic,
which enabled them to reconstruct the machine.
SAVILLE is a stream cipher. More precisely, it is a bit-stream cipher and
not a block cipher in some stream cipher mode, like OFB
SAVILLE has two modes-of-use:
- Autonomous mode (KAK)
One mode is the autonomous mode,
denoted by KAK
(Key Auto Key, comparable to OFB),
where it behaves as an autonomous finite
state machine generating a pseudo-random key stream.
- Autoclave mode (CTAK)
A second mode is the autoclave mode denoted by CTAK
(Cipher Text Auto Key, comparable to CFB),
in which mode there is dependency on the cipher text.
As with most OFB (KAK) stream ciphers, SAVILLE lacks a driving
function that guarantees a large minimum period of the keystream,
hence, there is a probability of the cipher being in a short cycle.
Means exist however, to check and prevent this short cycling.
SAVILLE is based on a nonlinear finite state machine, that has an internal
cycle of several tens of iterations per output bit.
This accounts for its low performance in many
implementations, for example in
MOTOROLA's Advanced Infosec Machine (AIM),
where SAVILLE is basically a software implementation,
running at 3% performance as compared to a standard block cipher.
The nonlinear part of the finite state machine can be described
by a nonlinear feedback shift register (NLFSR) that generates a
truncated De Bruijn sequence of maximum linear complexity .
SAVILLE uses a secret key of 120 bits length. In those days,
key loading devices such as KYK-13,
and UP-2001 were used.
From the documentation of these devices, one can conclude that an
eight-bit error detecting code was used to protect keys against
bit-errors and device malfunctioning, and therefore the total
key length was specified as 128 bits.
Also an Initial Vector (IV) has to be loaded to achieve cryptographic
synchronisation, although the CTAK-mode is self synchronising,
but also gives rise to error extension.
The finite state machine can be operated in 4 different configurations,
the so called (Invert) Rules of Motion, for various cryptographic purposes.
Switching between Rules of Motion during operation of the crypto-logic,
had a complex timing and caused serious implementation problems for
the developers who had to implement the algorithm, resulting in endless
compatibility testing sessions.
In the Early 1980s, Philips Usfa in Eindhoven
(Netherlands) received a first description of SAVILLE,
because it was developing its
and Spendex-50 narrow band and wide band
secure voice equipment.
Unlike before with Aroflex,
that used a Philips Usfa designed crypto logic,
this time it was decided to implement an existing and already approved
NATO crypto logic instead.
Clearly, this had a number of advantages.
First of all interoperability with existing NATO equipment like
the STU II crypto phone
and VINSON devices.
Secondly, it was anticipated that NATO approval by SECAN
would take much less time, by not having to evaluate the known
crypto logic again.
Rumour had it in those days, that there was a third reason.
By implementing SAVILLE in a new national development,
the Dutch security service NLNCSA would automatically receive all baseline documentation regarding
the crypto logic, which would otherwise not be obvious at all.
Still, to Philips Usfa and its cryptography-aware employees
it seemed quite peculiar that cryptographic equipment using a foreign,
NSA-developed crypto logic, was used to protect top secret information.
SAVILLE was implemented in hardware,
more precisely in circuits comprising a custom gate array
and standard integrated circuits,
by Philips Usfa in the first half of the 1980s.
This is supported by the fact that a detailed description was not
disclosed to Philips' employees until it was certain that the algorithm
would be implemented in the new Philips
narrowband (Spendex 40)
secure voice terminals.
The first document was a rather incomplete description, showing only
one mode of the algorithm, a one-way function to update key variables,
that does not have any critical Rule of Motion timing.
Already from that first document in the early 80s, it was clear to the
engineers at Philips, that the structure of the algorithm was ideally
suited for parallelization. One of the later documents indeed described
a single clock pulse implementation, but that document arrived 5 years later.
Products that use SAVILLE
Companies that have implemented SAVILLE
Initially, SAVILLE was used and implemented exclusively by GCHQ and the NSA.
Over the years however, some manufacturers in allied (NATO) countries were
allowed to implement SAVILLE in their devices.
The following companies are known to have implemented SAVILLE in one or
more of their products:
A block cipher mode that enhanced ECB mode by chaining together
blocks of cipher text it produces, and operating on plaintext segments
of variable length, less than or equal to the block length.
Cipher Text Auto-Key
Cryptographic logic that uses previous cipher text to generate a key stream.
(Depricated terminology, superceeded by CFB)
A block cipher mode in which a plaintext block is used directly as input
to the encryption algorithm and the resultant output block is used directly
as cipher text.
Cryptographic logic using a previous key to produce a key.
(Depricated terminology, superceeded by OFB)
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
Netherlands National Communications Security Agency
Dutch: Nationaal Bureau voor de Verbindingsbeveiliging.
a block cipher mode that modifies ECB mode to operate on
plaintext segments of variable length lesss than or equal to the
Military Committee Communications Security & Evaluation Agency (Washington)
- Wikipedia, SAVILLE
Retrieved December 2011.
- L-3 Communications, unityCP leaflet
Custom ASIC, High Performance Fixed and Programmable Crypto Engine.
Cleared by DoD for public release under 05-S-1912 on 18 August 2005.
Communication Systems East. 2 pages, April 2011.
- REDCOM, HDX-C Secure Converged Network module
Retreived from REDCOM website, December 2011.
- Anonymous, Former Cryptographer
Interview at Crypto Museum, December 2011.
- Anonymous, Former Security Expert
Personal correspondence, April 2013.
- Wikipedia, De Bruijn sequence
Retrieved May 2015.
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© Crypto Museum. Created: Sunday 04 December 2011. Last changed: Thursday, 21 September 2017 - 12:06 CET.